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ARGUMENT 
I. CAMBRIA'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(7) AND THE 
COURT SHOULD IGNORE ALL UNSUPPORTED FACTUAL OR 
EVIDENTIARY REFERENCES IN CAMBRIA'S BRIEF. 
As an initial matter, the Court should note the numerous instances wherein 
Cambria recites a purported fact without any support from the record. Indeed, many of 
the "facts" cited by Cambria were not presented as evidence during arbitration. Pursuant 
to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(7), "All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this rule." Subparagraph (e) of Rule 24 provides in relevant part, "References shall be 
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages 
of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to 
Rule 11(f) or 11(g)." 
The Statement of Facts section of Cambria's brief is a mere half page in length 
with only a handful of citations to the record. Cambria's failure to comply with the rule 
creates significant difficulty, where little would otherwise exist, regarding Why'rd's 
response to Cambria's briefing. Specifically, without citation to the record it is difficult 
to verify whether certain statements of "fact" were actually presented as evidence. 
Further, and more importantly, the paucity of record citation means this Court must either 
take Cambria at its word and accepts its factual assertions, or engage in its own 
exhaustive search of the record. An appellate court may properly refuse to "'consider 
any facts not property cited to, or supported by, the record.'" Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 
1 
P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1184 (Utah App. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
II. WHYRD FULFILLED THE AGREEMENT. 
a. The Arbitrator misinterpreted language in the Agreement which 
specifically provides that minimum levels of throughput are not 
guaranteed. 
Schedule 2 of the Agreement specifically provides that "[guarantee of minimum 
throughput levels are not available due to the constant fluctuation of utilization 
throughout the system." [R. 885:22-884:9], The parties' clear intent by this provision 
was that Why'rd could not promise a particular level of throughput. The provision was 
included in the Agreement with the intent to protect Why'rd in the event that the basic 
internet seivice for which Cambria was paying became insufficient for its tenants' needs. 
[R. 885:22-102:9; R. 882:8-20]. As is apparent from the Arbitrator's findings, the 
Arbitrator's interpretation of the "no guarantee" provision was incongment with the parties' 
intent and defied the plain language of the Agreement. 
Cambria argues that this "no guarantee" provision cannot be construed so broadly as 
to nullify all other provisions of the Agreement, and Why'rd whole heartedly agrees with 
this proposition. However, Why'rd's interpretation of the "no guarantee" language does not 
require this Court to ignore any of the other provisions in the Agreement. Specifically, 
Cambria points to language in the Agreement that "Bulk Programming will include the 
ability for each tenant to have access to 3mbps of download throughput...." Why'rd does 
not intend to read this language out of the Agreement. However, Cambria's own conduct 
prevented its residents from accessing 3 mbps throughput. 
2 
Cambria wants the Court to believe it is innocent of any contribution to the problems 
with Why'rd's service. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Cambria tenants engaged in 
commercial use of the internet. Cambria residents hosted web sites. [R. 976:22]. Why'rd 
observed at least half a dozen Cambria residents working from home as web site developers. 
[R. 975:12-14]. Cambria residents engaged in a commercial range of throughput. [R. 
973:11-12]. Cambria residents hosted at least two commercial web sites, one of which was 
a commercial pornographic website. [R. 972:9-14]. Cambria's own expert witness, 
Spencer Wangsgard, acknowledged that hosting a pornographic site is a commercial use. 
[R. 1539:8-12]. 
Ted Burnett testified that utilization of the internet at Cambria was at least 70 or 80 
percent higher than other similar developments he had monitored and that he had never seen 
a larger assembly of more internet hungry people ever. [R. 970:5-12]. Further, Ted Burnett 
stated that there was more bandwidth utilized in that particular project than in the other half 
dozen projects he was monitoring at the time. [R. 970:13-16]. Why'rd observed one tenant 
download over 1 gigabyte per hour for twelve hours. [R. 968:15-18]. Why'rd observed that 
another Cambria resident left for the weekend and downloaded all nine seasons of Stargate. 
[R. 964:15-18]. Cambria resident, Montane Hamilton, was using his intemet as a 
programmer to monitor certain websites he was running. [R. 1509:3-10] 
During the initial years of the contract, when there were not as many Cambria 
tenants, the amount of bandwidth contracted for was sufficient for demand. [R. 880:3-9]. 
However, as user-related problems began occurring with the internet, Cambria was 
unwilling to pay for increased bandwidth, and at no point did Cambria purchase more 
3 
bandwidth than that which was originally negotiated for in the 2005 contract. [R. 836:14-
17]. Why'rd offered to double Cambria's bandwidth for $2 per month; Cambria did not 
accept. [R. 890:13-17; see also R. 758:2-5]. Cambria informed Why'rd that it would not, 
under any circumstances, raise HOA fees. [R. 758:18-21], 
Cambria also refused to purchase a Quality of Service, or QOS, system to regulate 
internet use, believing that Why'rd was obligated to pay for the QOS. [R. 1592:19-25]. 
However, a plain reading of the Agreement clearly shows that there was no requirement for 
Why'rd to provide QOS or bandwidth throttling tools. [R. 1560:16-21]. 
The "no guarantee" provision in the Agreement rather obviously does not mean that 
Why'rd is obligated to provide a nxiiiimum threshold of 2.7 mbps throughput - there is no 
evidentiary support for that proposition. Furthermore, the Arbitrator never made a finding 
that the Agreement is ambiguous and any extrinsic evidence that may have been considered 
by the Arbitrator is inadmissible. The Court is, therefore, left with the task of deciphering 
what the "no guarantee" provisions means. As Cambria correctly argues, this provision 
cannot be used to obviate the other provisions of the Agreement. By the same token, other 
provisions of the Agreement cannot be read to obviate the "no guarantee" provision. 
The key to interpreting the Agreement's provisions harmoniously is found within the 
document itself. The Agreement provides that "[guarantee of minimum throughput levels 
are not available due to the constant fluctuation of utilization throughout the system." 
[Emphasis added]. In other words, Cambria bears the risk that throughput may fall below 
3 mbps based on its own utilization of the internet. As discussed above and in Why'rd's 
opening brief, Cambria residents over-used the basic level of internet service bargained 
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for, and used the internet in violation of the Agreement. Where Why'rd has, in good 
faith, attempted to provide 3 mbps throughput to Cambria, Cambria bears the risk that 
internet throughput may fall below that particular level. This is especially true where 
Cambria residents were receiving satisfactory internet early in the relationship when 
demand was lower. [See R. 880:3-9]. 
b. Why'rd Maintained Functional Internet Service for No Less than 20% 
of 120 Consecutive Days. 
The Agreement, at Schedule 2, clearly states that Why'rd was required to 
"maintain functional service for no less than 20% of a 120 consecutive day period." 
Cambria makes five arguments as to the inapplicability of this provision: 
First, Cambria argues that a rational person would not agree to purchase a product 
that only worked one out of every five days. This argument is not particularly helpful to 
the Court insofar as (a) Cambria did in fact agree to the 20% provision, and (b) whether a 
rational person would agree to this provision is not legally relevant. 
Second, Cambria argues that Section 3.7 of the Agreement, requiring Why'rd to 
reevaluate its services every two years to ensure that they are competitive, somehow 
renders the 20% provision immaterial As discussed above, the Court must give some 
meaning to the 20% provision and cannot write that provision out of the Agreement. 
Third, Cambria argues that Why'rd failed to provide functional service for even 
one day. This argument is not supported by the record and Cambria does not attempt to 
cite any evidence for its claim. The Arbitrator did not make any finding as to the number 
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of days Why'rd provided functional internet service. It would be plain error for the Court 
to base its decision on this argument. 
Fourth, Cambria argues that it is not commercially reasonable for Why'rd to only 
provide functional service 20% of the time. Again, Cambria fails to point to anything in 
the record to assist the Court with an understanding of commercial reasonableness. 
Cambria instead asks the Court to adopt its logic without regard to the language of the 
Agreement. Furthermore, Cambria agreed to the 20% provision, and commercial 
reasonableness is irrelevant. 
Fifth, Cambria points to the Arbitrator's findings that the internet was "frequently 
out", that "Other tenants found the internet to be unusable for normal residential internet 
use", and that "Long periods of disruption were experienced by tenants" as dispositive 
that the internet was not functional for at least 20% of a 120 day period. These are not 
dispositive findings. The Arbitrator did not make findings about the number of days the 
internet was "out" or how many days constitute "long periods of disruption" or the extent 
to which certain tenants found the internet unusable. 
The major flaw in Cambria's argument about the 20% provision is that Cambria 
offers no alternate meaning of this provision. Clearly the provision must mean 
something. Instead of proposing an interpretation of the 20%> provision, Cambria merely 
asks the Court to ignore the provision and render it meaningless. As discussed above, the 
Court must not render the 20% provision meaningless. The plain meaning of the 
provision is that, as long as the internet is functional for no less than 24 days out of 120, 
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Why'rd has fulfilled its commitment. The Arbitrator made no findings on this point and, 
if necessary, the Court should remand this matter to the District Court for findings. 
Cambria claims that the Agreement requires Why'rd to provide 24 consecutive 
days of functional service out of 120 days. Cambria's argument is inconsistent with the 
language of the Agreement providing that Why'rd "maintain functional service for no 
less than 20% of a 120 consecutive day period." The Agreement says nothing about the 
functional days being consecutive. Cambria did not bargain for 24 consecutive days of 
functional internet service - it bargained for 24 days out of a 120 consecutive day period. 
c. The Arbitrator misinterpreted Why'rd's obligations under the 
Agreement to monitor, control, and keep in good working order, the 
"System." 
Cambria mistakenly assumes that if the internet System is working correctly, its 
tenants should have access to 3 mbps throughput. Cambria fails to recognize that the 
reason its residents were experiencing slow internet was because of the demand on the 
available throughput and had nothing to do with the "System", as that term is defined in 
the Agreement. The Arbitrator wrongly construed the Agreement to mean that because 
the internet was slow, Why'rd must have failed in its obligation to keep the System in 
good repair. 
Cambria misconstrues Why'rd's argument to mean that Why'rd9s only obligation 
with respect to performance of the internet had to do with maintaining the equipment. 
Clearly, Why'rd was also obligated to meet certain customer service obligations. 
Importantly, the Arbitrator found that Why'rd's level of customer service did not 
constitute a breach of the Agreement. [Arbitral Award, p. 7]. 
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The Arbitral Award is necessarily predicated on an incorrect reading of the term 
"System" in the Agreement. System in not synonymous with service, as Cambria seems 
to indicate. If "System" were synonymous with service, Why'rd could not have fulfilled 
its customer service obligations while simultaneously breaching its obligations to keep 
the "System" in working order. 
d. Why'rd performed its obligation to provide cable television. 
In Section 3.1 of the Agreement, Why'rd disclaimed responsibility for blank, 
missing, and changing channels. Section 3.1 of the Agreement provides, in relevant part: 
Subscriber acknowledges that the owners/distributors of Bulk Programming, 
rather than [Why'rd], determine the content of the Bulk Programming, and as 
a result [Why'rd] shall have no responsibility of liability for Bulk 
Programming content. As between [Why'rd] and subscriber, or [Why'rd] and 
any Tenant, [Why'rd] has the sole right to edit, select, schedule and determine 
the [Why'rd] Programming services contained in the [Why'rd] programming 
packages .... [Why'rd] may add, delete, or modify the Bulk Programming, 
which may be caused, among other things, by satellite programming industry 
changes, deletions, additions, or the termination, modification or replacement 
of [Why'rd] programming agreements. 
Cambria insists that the term "content" in Section 3.1 is limited to the actual 
programs and shows provided by the Bulk Programming distributor. Review of the 
language of the Agreement reveals that the purpose of Section 3.1 is to relieve Why'rd of 
responsibility for conduct of the Bulk Programming distributor over which Why'rd has 
no control. The narrow interpretation of the term "content" espoused by Cambria would 
not take into account additional aspects of the Bulk Programming over which Why'rd has 
no control. 
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Cambria argues that Why'rd does in fact have the ability and power to make 
changes to the programming. Although Why'rd may make changes as to the selection of < 
channels delivered to Cambria, Why'rd does not have the ability or power to make any 
other changes to the programming. Why'rd has no control over whether a channel is 
i 
blank or fuzzy when delivered by the Bulk Programming distributor. Likewise, Why'rd 
has no control over whether a particular channel, like ESPN, is missing or assigned to a 
different channel number. The uncontroverted testimony of Why'rd's expert, David 
Springer, is that it is normal for a cable distributor to rotate the number channel on which 
it broadcasts its programming. [R. 1520:23-1519:8]. Thus, such complications and 
issues with cable television are managed and controlled by the Bulk Programming 
distributor and, therefore, are simply out of Why'rd's control. 
All that the Agreement requires is that Why'rd provide cable television. Whether 
the cable television had poor quality or not, Why'rd provided to Cambria the channels set 
forth in Schedule 1 of the Agreement. Why'rd did what it was contracted to do and 
Cambria got the channels it bargained for. If the cable television quality fell below a 
certain standard, the Agreement contains provisions for Cambria to address problems 
with Why'rd, and Cambria should have availed itself of the mechanisms set forth in 
Section 3.6 of the Agreement. Importantly, the Arbitrator concluded that "The customer 
service provided was marginal and problematic, but the Arbitrator does not specifically 
find that the low level of customer service constituted a material breach." [Arbitral 
Award, Conclusions, ^ 6], Thus, Why'rd fulfilled its obligations under Section 3.6. [See 
Arbitral Award, Conclusions, H 6]. Where the Arbitrator found that Why'rd did not 
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breach its obligations to provide customer service, the Arbitral Award should not 
conclude that "poor television service" constitutes a breach, particularly when the "poor 
television service" complained of was specifically disclaimed by Why'rd. Therefore, the 
Court should correct the Arbitrator's finding of breach as related to the cable television 
service. 
Cambria attempts to re-write the Agreement to include new provisions requiring 
Why'rd to make cable upgrades available to Cambria residents. Cambria claims that 
Why'rd breached the Agreement by failing to provide residents the ability to upgrade 
their cable packages. While the Arbitrator, in his findings of fact, did point to the 
residents' inability to upgrade to HD in the Arbitral Award, the Arbitrator did not find 
that this constituted a breach of the Agreement. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that blank, fuzzy, missing, and changing channels 
constitute a breach of the Agreement, the fact that Cambria experienced blank, fuzzy, 
missing, and changing channels is not a breach that defeats the purpose of the Agreement. 
Therefore, even if Why'rd failed in some particulars to provide quality cable television 
service, these breaches do not justify early termination of the Agreement. 
ffl. CAMBRIA BREACHED THE AGREEMENT WHEN ITS RESIDENTS 
ENGAGED IN "HIGH VOLUME" AND "COMMERICAL" INTERNET 
USE, THUS EXCUSING WHY'RD'S FURTHER PERFORMANCE OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
The Agreement, at Schedule 2, provides, "This system is not designed for the 
support of high volume or commercial grade servers. The system is designed as a 
'residential system,' meaning that high level of volume that indicates server related 
10 
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activity will be monitored and controlled to preserve the integrity of the system for all of 
its users." On appeal, Cambria argues that user-related activity is not the same as server-
related activity and, therefore, Why'rd's interpretation of the Agreement is flawed. 
Cambria goes through great lengths to describe alleged differences between high volume 
"use" and high volume "servers." Cambria's arguments, however, are unsupported by 
references to the record. Cambria expects the Court to accept at face value Cambria's 
unsupported assertions regarding the highly technical field of internet service. 
Cambria overlooks the fact that its own witness, Jason Sucher, used the terms 
"use" and "servers" interchangeably while testifying during the arbitration proceedings. 
Mr. Sucher testified that Cambria understood that certain types of uses of the system 
were not supported by the residential system that Why'rd was building. When asked 
about Cambria's understanding of Schedule 2 of the Agreement, Mr. Sucher testified, "I 
would say that our understanding of that was that people shouldn't be operating a server 
like streaming content which would require a great amount of bandwidth...." [R. 1300:1-
4]. Thus, streaming content on the Internet was akin to operating a server and constituted 
the type of use of the system that residents should not engage in. Additionally, Mr. 
Sucher testified that Cambria understood that residents were not supposed to operate 
home businesses using the residential system, (R. 1301:12-15), and equated running a 
home business to running a server (R. 1299:11-12). 
Spencer Wansgard, an expert witness for Cambria, also used the term "users" 
when testifying about Schedule 2. When asked what it meant to "monitor and control a 
system," as it related to the provision of Schedule 2 that "high level of volume that 
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indicates server related activity will be monitored and controlled to preserve the integrity 
of the system for all of its users/' Mr. Wansgard testified that it meant to "manage heavy 
bandwidth users." (emphasis added) [R. 1131:24-l 130:3]. 
The record also reflects that David Springer, an expert witness for Why'rd, 
testified that the above-referenced provision of Schedule 2 meant that the system was not 
designed to support high volume use. [R. 735:6-18]. Thus, Mr. Springer's expert 
testimony does not embrace the same narrow-interpretation of the term "server" that 
Cambria now asserts. 
It seems clear from the evidence presented at arbitration that the distinction 
between high volume "use" and high volume "servers" that Cambria now attempts to 
engender is not a distinction that was used during the arbitration proceedings. In fact, 
such a distinction was not alleged or pursued by Cambria at any time during the 
Arbitration proceeding. 
As witnesses testified during Arbitration, a handful of commercial-grade users can 
hog the available bandwidth, slowing down internet speeds for the whole Cambria 
community. Ted Burnett testified at Arbitration that he observed a single resident 
continuously using 51% of the total bandwidth available to the entire Cambria 
community to download nine seasons of "Stargate." [R. 968:15-964:18]. Mr. Burnett 
also testified that there were about half a dozen residents who were using a lot of 
bandwidth as web developers. [R. 956:1-2]. As is evident from email correspondence 
between the parties, Cambria understood that these "bandwidth hogs," as they were 
called, caused the internet to service to slow down. [R. 934:9-15]. 
12 
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Additionally, the record shows that Cambria residents were actually hosting 
servers on the residential system. According to the testimony of Ted Burnett, he 
observed a Cambria resident hosting servers in his individual unit to host a commercial 
pornographic Web site. [R. 956:17-955:4]. 
The evidence presented at Arbitration establishes that the parties understood the 
terms "use" and "server related activity" synonymously. Cambria residents engaged in 
"high volume" or "commercial" use of the residential system built by Why'rd. Thus, the 
Arbitrator clearly erred when he failed to find that Cambria residents engaged in "high 
volume" or "commercial" internet use. 
IV. CAMBRIA INTERFERRED WITH WHY'RD'S PERFORMANCE OF ITS 
OBLIGATIONS AS THEY RELATE TO PROVIDING QUALITY 
INTERNET SERVICE, 
Cambria argues that it bargained for basic services and not broken services. Why'rd 
agrees with this statement. However, the Arbitrator did not find that Why'rd never provided 
basic services. As of December 2006, Why'rd was providing seven Tl lines, or 10.5 mbps 
throughput, to the head-end unit at Cambria. [R. 961:16-960:10]. Ten-and-a-half mbps 
throughput exceeded what Why'rd was obligated to provide under the Agreement. [R. 
846:5-11]. The Arbitrator made no finding that services were subpar at the beginning of the 
relationship. In fact, and this is a critical point, Why'rd successfully provided its services at 
the beginning of the relationship. During the initial years of the contract, when there were 
not as many Cambria tenants, the limited bandwidth was sufficient for demand. [R. 880:3-
9]. 
13 
Why'rd folly acknowledges that the services eventually became unsatisfactory, but 
the Court must examine the reasons for the breakdown in service. By way of its appeal, 
Why'rd argues that the services failed for the following reasons: 
a. Cambria did not permit Why'rd to disconnect abusers of the Internet system. 
b. Cambria refused a QOS system. 
c. Cambria refused to purchase more bandwidth. 
Cambria's actions prevented Why'rd's efforts to cany out its obligation to 
monitor, control, and keep the system in good working order. Had Cambria allowed 
Why'rd to temporarily disconnect abusers of the internet system, or had Cambria agreed 
to a QOS, Why'rd would have been able to effectively control the system and keep it in 
good working order. Similarly, if Cambria had accepted Why'rd's offer and agreed to 
pay $2 more per month per tenant, Why'rd could have doubled Cambria's bandwidth, 
which would have vastly improved the internet quality. 
Cambria does not dispute that it instructed Why'rd that it could not shut off heavy 
internet users. Why'rd was able to determine when a resident was abusing the system by 
monitoring the system and studying trends and use graphs. [R. 965:12-19]. By doing so, 
Why'rd could pinpoint high volume throughput to individual units. [R. 965:12-19]. On 
one particular occasion, Ted Burnett observed that one unit was using up more than half 
of the bandwidth available to the entire Cambria community. [R. 965:12-964:18]. Mr. 
Burnett tried to contact the resident for several hours and left numerous messages for the 
resident. [R. 965:12-964:18]. Mr. Burnett turned off the resident's Internet access only 
after Mr. Burnett's attempts to contact the resident, over the course of several hours, were 
14 
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unsuccessful. [R. 965:12-964:18]. The resident returned Mr. Burnett's messages several 
days later and inquired about why his Internet was not working. [R. 965:12-964:18]. 
However, this resident's service was restored after Why'rd was able to have a discussion 
with the resident regarding his heavy use of the bandwidth. [R. 963:8-14]. 
Thus, Why'rd only temporarily turned off an abuser's internet access until Why'rd 
could speak with the abuser to discuss the problem. Additionally, the record shows that a 
resident's service was turned off only after a thorough investigation of the problem and if 
Why'rd was not able to speak with the resident about their usage. The record also 
reflects that even after Why'rd knew which unit was hogging the bandwidth, Why'rd did 
not immediately resort to turning off access but waited several hours as Why'rd tried to 
contact the abusing resident. Why'rd, therefore, was not permanently denying residents 
access to the internet, but rather was controlling the system against abusers after 
completing a thorough investigation of the abuse and attempting to speak with the 
abusing resident. Cambria later instructed Why'rd that it could not shut off heavy 
internet users, thereby interfering with Why'rd's method of controlling abuse on the 
system. [R. 963:15-962:18]. 
Additionally, the bandwidth problem shifted from dealing with a handful of 
bandwidth hogs to everyone demanding more bandwidth. [R. 869:9-11]. The only way 
that Why'rd could have resolved the issue of residents wanting more bandwidth was to 
actually provide more bandwidth than what Why'rd was already providing. [R. 869:9-
11]. Cambria, however, refused to pay for additional bandwidth, and Cambria simply 
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was not paying for enough bandwidth for everyone to have the Internet speed that they 
assumed they could get. [R. 1437:15-17; 1357:4-10]. 
Finally, Cambria does not dispute that it refused the QOS. Cambria's stated 
reason for the refusal was that it felt that Why'rd was obligated to purchase the QOS. 
Cambria argues that Why'rd was obligated to purchase the QOS because Why'rd had a 
duty to monitor and control the system. However, when purchasing a basic Tl line, the 
purchaser receives only a basic level of control and management and not the QOS that is 
part of a higher-quality package. [R. 833:17-22]. Cambria's argument that Why'rd was 
responsible for the cost of the QOS fails to take into account the fact that Cambria 
purposefully contracted for very basic Internet service. Cambria was not interested in 
investing in high quality Internet service but only want to ensure that the backbone was in 
place. [R. 895:10-23]. Why'rd indicated that it could install a Tl line that would give all 
of the residents access to the internet and there would be very minimal management of 
such a basic service. [R. 895:10-23]. It was clear at the outset that Why'rd would not be 
providing extensive monitoring or control of the system. [R. 895:10-23]. Cambria's 
insistence that Why'rd cover the cost of the QOS, an expense not accounted for in the 
Agreement, would permit Cambria to demand additional services than those for which it 
originally contracted. Such conduct would, in turn, diminish the value and expected 
benefit for which Why'rd contracted. 
Because Cambria refused solutions to the internet problems, Why'rd, under the 
circumstances, satisfactorily performed its obligations under the Agreement. Any failure 
by Why'rd to perform its obligations was a direct result of Cambria not allowing Why'rd 
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to shut off bandwidth hogs, its refusal to purchase additional bandwidth, and its refusal to 
purchase a QOS. The Arbitrator found that "Why'rd failed to keep the system ( 
competitive within industry standards." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact, f 24]. Based 
on this, the Arbitrator concluded that "the price and quality of the services offered by 
Why'rd were not comparable to those offered to the general public and this constituted a 
material breach." [Arbitral Award, Conclusions, ^ j 3(f)]. Where Cambria prevented 
Why'rd's efforts to ensure the quality of the service it was providing, this Court should rule 
that Why'rd's performance of the Agreement is excused. 
V, CAMBRIA HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
Despite the existence of the Agreement, Why'rd is entitled to unjust enrichment 
damages. Cambria argues that the Agreement makes provision for premature termination -
this is true. However, the provision identified by Cambria in Schedule 2 has nothing to do 
with what would happen to the physical infrastructure, or the value thereof, in the event of 
premature termination. The parties did not contemplate the treatment of the infrastructure 
upon premature temiination of the Agreement, and equity must fill in the void. 
Cambria argues that Why'rd bore the risk that it would lose the value of the 
infrastructure if it failed to perform under the Agreement. Cambria then opines on 
communication industry standards without any support from the record. What Cambria 
fails to recognize is that Why'rd is not attempting to recover, in unjust enrichment, the 
entire value of the infrastructure, but only the pro-rated value of the infrastructure for the 77 
months Cambria failed to make payments under the Agreement. Those 77 months represent 
payments that Cambria never made for the infrastructure it received. 
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Cambria disagrees with Why'rd's reliance on Bailey-Allen Co. Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 
P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) and Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418 (Utah 1961). The Bailey-
Allen Court cited Corbin on Contracts §§ 700 & 710 to establish the rule that 
[i]f the defective performance, though less than 'substantial' has conferred benefits 
on the defendant in excess of his [or her] injury, he [or she] may be under a quasi-
contractual duty to pay that excess. Id. § 700, at 310. Thus, [a] contractor whose 
breach is such that he [or she] has rendered less than "substantial performance" has 
no right to the contract price; he [or she] is said to have no remedy "on the 
contract".... The contractor's right is a right to reasonable compensation for value 
received by the defendant over and above the injury suffered by the contractor's 
breach. Id. § 710. 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc., 876 P.2d at 425 (quotations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Cambria argues that Why'rd was paid for the time period before which Cambria 
terminated the Agreement, and that such payments compensated Why'rd for the value of the 
work it provided. This analysis is inadequate in light of the enomiity of the upfront cost of 
the Cambria infrastructure - $834,570.88. The only way Why'rd could recover the cost of 
its infrastructure was to receive payments over the life of the Agreement. Cambria failed to 
compensate Why'rd for 65.8 percent of the infrastructure it received. The amounts paid by 
Cambria to Why'rd are simply deficient to compensate Why'rd for tihe substantial 
investment it made into the Cambria project. Why'rd is entitled to "reasonable 
compensation for value received" by Cambria. 
To the extent the Court agrees with Cambria that the value of the infrastructure was 
inadequately established at Arbitration, the Court should remand this matter to the District 
Court with instructions to enter an award for the pro-rated value of the infrastructure or 
"reasonable compensation for value received" by Cambria. Furthermore, the Court may 
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need to remand this matter for the District Court to sort through the issues Cambria raises, 
which, again, are outside the scope of the record, concerning what pieces of infrastructure 
remain at the property and the proper ownersliip of certain components of the infrastructure. 
VI. THE ARBITRATOR ERRED IN FINDING THAT WHY'RD DID NOT 
PROVIDE "SYSTEM CAPACITY OF 10 MBPS THROUGHPUT.55 
Cambria accuses Why'rd of trying to deceive this Court. To begin with, this 
accusation is untrue, This issue actually seemed rather simple to Why'rd, and Why'rd is 
quite shocked at the visceral reaction from Cambria. Why'rd's arguments to the Court on 
this point, and all other points of its brief, were entirely genuine. 
For its part, Why'rd equates "system capacity" with the available bandwidth at the 
headend unit. Because 10 mbps came into the headend, 10 mbps is the capacity of the 
system. There is ample and abundant support for this proposition in the record: David 
Springer testified that his guaranteed testimony was that the system capacity was well 
beyond 10 mbps. [R. 1528:4-7]. Robert Schmoyer testified that Why'rd provided system 
capacity from the headend to the customer of at least 10 mbps. [R. 669:6-18]. Cambria's 
attorney stepped through a hypothetical with Mr. Schmoyer in which a pipe represented 
system capacity, and Mr. Schmoyer identified the capacity as 10 mbps. [R. 648:13-22]. In 
fact, the Cambria system capacity ultimately reached 50 mbps, greatly exceeding 10 mbps. 
[R. 886:13-885:11]. 
Cambria's argument equates the term "system capacity" with individual tenant 
throughput access. Cambria fails to identify anything in the record to support its argument. 
Cambria relies heavily on the notion that this issue was somehow resolved on a Motion in 
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Limine heard by the Arbitrator on December 7,2010, but it was not. By its Motion in 
Limine Why'rd asked the Arbitrator to construe the Agreement to mean that its obligations 
flowed to Cambria and not to the Cambria residents. The discussion on the Motion in 
Limine about system capacity did not deal with Why'rd's performance as much as it dealt 
with the identity of the obligee of Why'rd's promises. 
The Arbitrator's Decision on the Motion in Limine certainly does not support 
Cambria's position. The only reference by the Arbitrator to system capacity is a mere 
recitation of the Agreement's provision obligating Why'rd to provide system capacity 
within the project of 10 mbps to each tenant [Arbitral Award, Exhibit A, p. 3]. The 
Arbitrator's Decision made no finding, in any sense, that Why'rd had failed to meet this 
obligation. 
The Arbitrator found that Why'rd breached the Agreement by its "Failure to provide 
each tenant with access to 3 mbps of download throughput upon completion of the project." 
[Arbitral Award]. Cambria urges the Court to adopt a completely redundant finding that 
Why'rd also breached by failing to provide each tenant with access to 10 mbps. Cambria's 
reading of the Arbitral Award overlaps these two conclusions. 
The Arbitral Award provides no factual findings or other basis for the detennination 
that Why'rd breached the Agreement by failing to provide a system capacity of 10 mbps. 
The conclusion of breach is a complete oddity without evidentiary support. 
The finding of breach on this point is clearly erroneous inasmuch as Cambria cannot 
point to any evidence it presented, or any fact the Arbitrator could have relied on, to support 
such a finding. Cambria does not point to a single fact upon which this finding of breach 
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could have been based. Furthermore, under a correctness standard, the Arbitrator 
misconstrued the stipulation of the parties. System capacity is equivalent to the available 
bandwidth at the headend unit, and is not, as Cambria now claims, the same thing as tenant 
access. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Why'rd respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
Arbitral Award and remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Appellant. 
DATED and SIGNED this jt_ day of May, 2012. 
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